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Abstract
Objective: To document representations of
the 1998 introduction of a 30% rebate on
private health insurance in the three most-
read daily Sydney newspapers.
Methods: Thematic frame analysis of 131
newspaper articles.
Results: The rebate was opposed through
two frames: that it was ineffective and
unfair, and that it was politically motivated.
Four supportive frames were more
complex: the rebate was justified by claims
that public health care was collapsing, that
responsible citizens should pay for their
own health care, and that individuals would
benefit financially. There was also a focus
on the political battle in the Senate. The
newspaper with the readership least likely
to benefit from the rebate supported it most
strongly.
Conclusions: Framing was strongly
episodic (two dimensional,
decontextualised and case-study based),
limiting political accountability, and the anti-
rebate case was presented less memorably.
Community action around the issue was
not encouraged, individual responsibility
was emphasised and universal health care
was not promoted as fair or necessary.
Different readerships received different
messages about the rebate.
Implications: There is an urgent need to
promote the value of the public health care
system and make the future of Medicare
compelling for news editors and the public.
(Aust N Z J Public Health 2001; 25: 265-71)
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On 10 December 1998, Australianfederal politicians emerged lateafter a ‘knife edge vote’.1 “It’s
been a long night, it’s been a hard fight but
we’ve delivered on the promise,” said the
Health Minister. “We are immensely pleased.
It’s a great result for Australia.”2 The Gov-
ernment had ‘delivered’ a 30% tax rebate on
premiums for all Australians with private
health insurance.3 The bill was opposed
strongly by Labor, the Greens and, after ini-
tial attempts at a compromise deal, the Aus-
tralian Democrats.3 Independent Senator
Brian Harradine promised to block the bill,6,7
but, after a last-minute meeting with the
Prime Minister, relented.2 Since its imple-
mentation the cost of the initiative has been
estimated to be between $A2.5 and $A3 bil-
lion a year (for comparison, the reported
health and aged care budget bottom-line for
2000/01 is $A135.4 billion).4,5
This paper analyses coverage of the rebate
in the three most popular daily newspapers
sold in Sydney, from the first explicit men-
tion of the rebate (14 August 1998) to the
passing of the rebate in the Senate (last re-
port 26 December 1998). Our analysis rests
on a belief that the market fails for health,
with subsequent need for government inter-
vention to make health care accessible to all
regardless of income. This position is con-
sistent with support for Medicare, which
finances private and public hospitals and
general practice in Australia through progres-
sive taxation.8
We will focus on media ‘framings’ of the
30% rebate. ‘Frames’ are the taken-for-
granted assumptions through which the
‘news’ is selected and presented by media
professionals. Although frames influence the
version of the ‘news’ which is promoted, they
can seem ‘natural’ to an uncritical audience,
and even to news professionals them-
selves.9,10 ‘Framing’ subtly alters the pres-
entation of problems and their solutions, with
resultant ‘framing effects’: changes in con-
sumers’ perceptions of what an issue is ‘re-
ally about’, who is responsible for it and
whether change is possible.9 Iyengar distin-
guishes episodic framing, which is concrete
and focuses on case studies or events, from
thematic framing, which is more conceptual,
facilitating a deeper understanding through
contextualisation.9 He proposes that the
dominance of episodic framing diminishes
government and societal accountability by
communicating that individuals are respon-
sible for their own circumstances. Charlotte
Ryan suggests the need for ‘mobilising’
frames, which present problems as collec-
tive and encourage community action, avoid-
ing the ‘victim blaming’ and individualism
that the new public health also warns against
and argues that, rather than explicate a core
argument, news is more likely to use sym-
bol, metaphor, catch-phrases and anecdote
to make a frame ‘real’ for audiences.10,11
Method
We searched for instances of the keywords
‘health insurance’ and ‘rebate’ between
1 August 1998 and 31 January 1999 in three
newspapers. The Daily Telegraph and The
Australian were accessed via Reuters’ Busi-
ness Briefing,12 a web-based database. The
Health and Health Care
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Table 1: Demographics of weekday readership for the three newspapers analysed.
The Daily Telegraph The Sydney Morning Herald The Australian
Quintilea n (’000s) % n (’000s) % n (’000s) %
AB 211 18 391 46 65 56
C 250 21 212 25 28 24
D 255 22 132 16 14 12
E 242 21 75 9 4 3
FG 210 18 40 5 5 4
TOTAL 1,168 100 850 100 116 100
Note:
(a) Newspaper advertising or circulation departments commission market research to map their readerships for the information of potential advertisers. The five
categories (quintiles) displayed above are the groupings used to measure socio-economic status (SES). AB is the highest SES, FG the lowest. Allocation to a
group is determined by a combination of income, education and occupation. Data acquired via personal communication with the publishers based on Roy Morgan
polling from December 2000. Percentages rounded.
Table 2: Episodes in the period of coverage.
Dates Main events
Prior to 13 August 1998 A limited means tested rebate is made available from July 1997. This rebate is intended to maintain or increase
the number of people with private health insurance but is deemed to be a failure. Membership of private health
funds is reported to be shrinking.
13 August 1998 The Federal Government announces its ‘family friendly’ tax package, which includes the introduction of a
Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the 30% rebate.
1 September 1998 Election campaign 1998 begins.
Taxation and health become dominant election issues.
3 October 1998 Federal election.
The conservative Liberal-National Party coalition is returned to power.
Week of 9 November 1998 Legislation including the 30% rebate introduced.
Week of 23 November 1998 Senate begins debating the legislation.
7 December 1998 Senate committee reports on the issue.
Night of 10 December 1998 Legislation passed in the Senate.
1 January 1999 Rebate introduced.
Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) was accessed via a CD ROM
archive.13 These papers are read by different demographic groups
(see Table 1). The Australian’s profile is the most affluent, fol-
lowed by the SMH. The Daily Telegraph’s readership is spread
evenly across socio-economic groups.
The period of coverage can be divided into seven episodes (see
Table 2). The ‘main event’ in each of these episodes often pro-
vided the peg or journalistic pretext for media coverage.
The search produced 131 articles, 51 (39%) each from The
Australian and the SMH, and 29 (22%) from The Daily Telegraph,
which were divided into chronological groupings according to
the episodes in Table 2. Using Ryan’s framework, 18 mutually
exclusive frames were identified, in six major groupings.10
Because a single article often presented a balance between sev-
eral frames, articles were not coded for a primary or dominant
frame, but for all frames present (mean=1.96 frames per article).
Results
A total of 257 instances of the six frames were identified. The
frames are detailed in Tables 3 and 4 and their frequencies in
Table 5.
Frames used by opponents of the rebate
The case against the rebate in the media studied incorporated
just two primary frames.
Opposing frame one: It won’t work and it’s not fair
This frame presented the rebate as a payout to rich consumers
who would have remained insured regardless. It was the most
common frame, occurring in 53% of articles, equally prominent
in The Australian and the SMH but rare in The Daily Telegraph,
despite the potential appeal to its lower-income readership. The
frame peaked in the week of the Senate debate, as Opposition
argument generated news stories.14-18 Labor warned that ‘Aus-
tralia’s richest 20% would get almost half the rebate,19 that ‘mil-
lionaires would qualify,14 and that Medicare ‘[would] not survive
another Coalition Government.20 Journalists, particularly in the
SMH, also argued this frame in opinion pieces:
‘If you’ve heard of politicians throwing money at a problem, this is
the classic case. Rather than tackle the real issues, [The Prime
Minister John] Howard just wrote another cheque on the
taxpayers’ account and looked the other way. It would be mislead-
ing to say that Mr Howard’s new rebate papers over the cracks. It
actually makes the cracks wider.’21
Carter and Chapman Article
2001 VOL. 25 NO. 3 AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 267
Table 3: The two frames used by opponents of the rebate. Framework by Charlotte Ryan.10
Frames Symbols Supporting arguments
Package Core frame Core position
(the issue is…)
It won’t work and The impact of The rebate is unjustifiable Subsidising gym membership It is not fair to implement a
it’s not fair the rebate on because it will not improve and tennis racquets. rebate that will go mostly to
the health the health care system, Millionaires would qualify. the well off. Governments
care system wastes precious health should operate effectively and
dollars and only benefits the rich. spend wisely.
Bribery and Political The rebate is being used to ‘Fistful of dollars prime minister’. The rebate is driven by Liberal
corruption transparency buy votes and prop up private Fat Cats. party support for the private
and fair dealing health: it’s a giant swindle. The Big Steal. sector. Governments should
act in the best interests of the
whole population, not just the
faction that supports them.
Table 4: The four frames used by proponents of the rebate. Framework by Charlotte Ryan 10
Frames Symbols Supporting arguments
Package Core frame Core position
(the issue is…)
The end is nigh The future of the The collapse of the private Apocalypse/ extinction. If people have paid for private
private health health industry is a disaster Health system as dying patient. health insurance it should
industry that must be averted. cover all their expenses.
The public system relies on the
private system for survival and
will collapse without it.
Make my day Political supremacy The rebate is the basis of a Health minister as action hero. Strong personalities and the
and the right to symbolic war between ideologies: drama of the contest drive politics.
govern the victor will have the upper hand Whoever wins the battle over the
in other policy areas. rebate will win on GST. If a
Government is voted in on a
policy they have a right to
implement it.
You get what Who should be The Government wants to reward Public health stretched to Battling Aussies deserve a fair go
you deserve responsible for responsible citizens who finance breaking point. and the Government should
financing their own private health cover Rich greedy freeloaders. provide it for them. The very rich
healthcare and thus have access to the The ‘battlers’ are being robbed. are fair game.
choice and quality that Only those who try to help Paying your own way is more
private health provides. themselves deserve help. responsible than relying on the
public purse.
What’s in it The financial effect The rebate will provide Christmas present for families. The rebate is a handout – what is
for me? of the rebate on individuals with extra money. important is whether you, the
individuals reader, will get more money.
‘The Government is spending $1300 million of the taxpayers’ money
to save the taxpayer $350 million … it’s a total nonsense …
taxpayers would spend at least $2500 to buy each new member.’22
Although frequent, this theme rarely dominated, instead func-
tioning as a final counterweight inserted to ‘balance’ the Govern-
ment’s view.
Opposing frame two: Bribery and corruption
Accusations of unfair dealing by the Coalition occurred in 35%
of articles, and increased after the rebate was passed. Under the
headline, ‘Fistful-of-dollars PM pumped up as never before’, sen-
ior journalist Paul Kelly wrote: “Howard knew how hard it was to
sell a GST so he’s gone for overkill … [the rebate is a] targeted
bribe [by a] fistful-of-dollars PM pumped up for battle. Frankly,
if this doesn’t sell the GST then it’s beyond salvation. A very
hefty price is being paid.”23
Other journalists agreed.24 The Government’s real priorities were
... “to buy votes rather than improve healthcare.”25 The rebate had
… “bought off the ire of the mere 30 per cent of the population
who remain in private health insurance, bought off the doctors,
private hospitals and health funds with a vested interest in the
insurance system and bought [Howard] another term in office
without a commitment to deal with root causes.”21 The Coalition
was siphoning public money off to the private sector:26-29 the “vast
medical industry fed to obesity on the public teat.”30 One journal-
ist wrote:
‘As for the 70 per cent of the population not covered by private
health insurance and with no intention of taking it out, they have a
right to feel hard done by, particularly by the Coalition. What other
industry, particularly in an era of shrinking Government, could
expect to receive a 30% subsidy from taxpayers for its operations?
Who, moreover, in the face of the failure of previous generous ef-
forts to prop them up, could expect the Government to shovel ever-
increasing amounts in their direction?’31
The Bill seemed doomed until eleventh-hour negotiations be-
tween Howard and Brian Harradine, an independent senator who
Health and Health Care John’s $12 tonic
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Table 5: Frequency of frame occurrence.
Number of Per cent of 131 articles Percentage of total references to this frame occurring in the...
references  containing this framea Australian Daily Telegraph Sydney Morning Herald
It won’t work and it’s not fair 70 53 43 14 43
The end is nigh 50 38 50 20 30
Bribery and corruption 46 35 48 9 43
Make my day 44 34 36 16 48
You get what you deserve 39 28 26 41 13
What’s in it for me? 8 6 0 75 25
Note:
(a) Articles were coded for all frames present, thus percentages add to >100
held the deciding vote. These negotiations were called immedi-
ately into question. ‘Howard and the health funds have pulled off
The Big Steal’6 wrote one journalist and another, under the head-
line ‘Psst, wanna buy a deal on rebates?’32 wrote: “Brian Harradine
has been duped. Suckered. Sold a pup. He has given away a prin-
ciple for the nearest thing to nothing you can get.” Harradine fell
for a “billion-dollar bribe” and was “conned by experts.”7 The
account of the deal had overtones of a seduction – Harradine
“teased the Government all night”33 and then refused to kiss and
tell the next morning, giving no explanation for his turnaround.7
Frames used by proponents of the rebate
Proponents of the rebate received more media coverage for a
greater number of frames, which were more memorable and dra-
matic. There were four rebate-supporting frames in our sample.
Supporting frame 1: The end is nigh
This frame promised a non-specific but inexorable future apoca-
lypse if Australians reneged on private insurance. This alarmism
featured in 38% of articles in the study period. It was the domi-
nant theme in 1998 before the rebate was announced, invoked in
all three papers but sustained particularly by a single journalist in
The Australian over some months.34-37
Images included “desertion”,38 “plummeting membership”,35
“exodus”,34 a “China Syndrome Meltdown”39 and “alarming and
catastrophic decline.”37 The rebate was the “last chance saloon”
for the private sector.40 “Failure to support the rebate [would] drive
a nail in the coffin of the private sector and a knife in the back of
public hospitals”,40 with “private health insurance becoming
extinct and only public hospitals and waiting lists surviving.”41
The metaphor of health-system-as-ailing-patient served this frame
well, with headlines such as ‘Cash injection ruled out as funds
bleed’42 and ‘Pre poll bid to resuscitate health funds.’36
‘The gap’ (the difference between the fees charged by doctors
and the amount paid by insurers) was part of this impending doom:
a cost “saddled by the consumer”.32,43,44 Poignant case studies
illustrated the impact of ‘the gap’ on individuals. It was an injus-
tice, a disincentive for consumers and a priority for policy atten-
tion. Only Mark Ragg in The Australian pointed out that “Medicare
is the ultimate ‘no gap’ policy,”32 providing comprehensive cover
according to ability to pay.
With the notable exception of two SMH articles during the Sen-
ate debate,21,45 no journalist addressed the key question: what,
exactly, was the problem with a decline in private health insur-
ance coverage? Decreased membership primarily diminishes pri-
vate health insurance shareholder coffers (monies which are not
necessarily spent on health care). Health insurance was held pre-
dominantly by the relatively well-off. Because of taxation arrange-
ments, decreased membership would have required more
non-privately insured high-income earners to pay a 1% tax levy,
potentially increasing funds available for Medicare (if they were
hypothecated). Because of legislative arrangements it would have
obliged the Federal Government to give the States more money
for health care. Thus it could have effectively increased the tax-
funded pool for public hospitals and community health. But this
possibility was overridden by a doomsday dramatisation of a bleak,
frightening, uninsured future.
Supporting frame 2: Make my day
In 34% of articles, journalists focused on the fight for political
supremacy that the rebate debate represented, first at the election
and then in the Senate. This frame dominated in the week run-
ning up to the Senate vote (46% of all frames coded in this pe-
riod). It was especially prominent in the SMH (48% of occurrences
of this frame) and much less prominent in the Telegraph (16%).
The sides lined up: in the blue corner, the Liberal/National
Coalition, the Australian Medical Association and the private
health industry; in the red corner the Labor Party, the Australian
Democrats, the Doctors’ Reform Society, consumers, some not-
for-profit private hospitals and the public health system. In the
middle, two independents with the balance of power. Howard went
to the October 1998 election on a number of promises, including
the rebate and, more controversially, a national goods and serv-
ices tax (GST). If the Liberals could not pass a paltry 30% insur-
ance rebate through the Senate, what chance did they have in
succeeding with a comprehensive GST later in the year?
The episodic framing of this political jousting often took prec-
edence over the detail and implications of the bill itself, which
was merely a vehicle illustrating the Government’s skills in power
brokerage. The Democrats disappeared from the headlines once
their compromise was rejected,46,47 leaving a standoff between
Labor and the Coalition with the independents as wild cards,
Carter and Chapman Article
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holding the fate of the nation in their hands.48 Health Minister
Wooldridge played a Dirty Harry-style action hero, promising to
play hardball and issuing direct threats. “Make our day: NSW
Labor will pay the price”, he promised.49 “I tell you, if Labor
votes against it we will go after them in their marginal seats.”50
Supporting frame 3: You get what you deserve
This frame communicated a key subtext of the proponent’s
arguments: that those who could not afford private cover were not
trying hard enough. The rebate was a reward for those responsi-
ble citizens who financed their own cover, often at great personal
cost to themselves. The Government was champion of the hard-
working low-income earners who were prepared to make sacri-
fices to access quality care.
The Health Minister was clear about these underlying princi-
ples. “We are making a philosophical statement that we wish to
help those people who are trying to help themselves,”18 he said:
those with insurance were “making sacrifices” to be “self-reli-
ant” and thus deserved the “control and choice that private health
offers”.51 Even more remarkable was the Prime Minister’s state-
ment that level of income (and thus, we assume by inference,
equity) was “not the point:”52
Mr Howard … said he would accept the 30 per cent saving, although
he didn’t need the money. “I am earning, by community standards,
a very high income,” Mr Howard said … “but that’s not the point.
The name of the game is to get volume, to get large numbers of
people taking out health insurance to take the load off the public
hospital system”.52
This frame occurred in 28% of articles. The Daily Telegraph
promoted it particularly strongly: 29% of the Telegraph’s coded
frames were in this category, in contrast to 9% of the total frames
in The Australian and 13% in the SMH. Forty-one per cent of
occurrences of this frame were in the Telegraph, despite the small
number of articles it ran on the rebate overall.
The arguments were multifaceted. The private system was
framed as superior and aspirational, aided by dramatic charac-
terisations of the public system as chaotic, consisting of “stretched
budgets, overcrowded emergency departments and an ever ready
supply of patients waiting to fill dwindling beds.”45 The need to
“ease the burden on the public system” was a given.53 The rich
were accused of exploiting this public system, which would be
freed up if they behaved decently and took out private insur-
ance.45,54 According to the Prime Minister, Labor was “spawning
a new species of elite Australian: Macklin’s Millionaires” (named
after the shadow health minister) “who opted out of private cover
and put pressure on the public system.”50 Despite the potential
for the progressive Medicare levy to subsidise care for the less
well off from the contributions of the wealthy, a caricature of the
greedy rich and the intuitive logic that “those who can pay should
pay” often won out, particularly in The Daily Telegraph.40,55,56
Even more remarkable was “the rhetorical battle for the bat-
tlers.”50 The Coalition emphasised that it was “going into bat for
the low-income earners of Australia,”25,57,58 a masterful counter
to any argument that the rebate was inequitable:
”[Howard said the rebate was] a boon for low income earners…
who scrimp and save to give themselves the security of private health
insurance.”50
“John Howard warned yesterday 700,000 low-income earners would
be penalised if enabling legislation failed in the Senate… “this propo-
sition that everybody who’s got private health insurance is a mil-
lionaire is absolute nonsense”, Mr Howard told Parliament. “I say
to the low-income earners of Australia, I want to say to the pen-
sioners …we will help you keep your private health insurance.”59
This stance was enriched by claims that the wealthy subsidised
the poor in health funds46,56 (how this applied to flat fee private
insurance and not a progressive Medicare levy was never
explained) and by the mandate of Howard’s electoral success. This
mandate was something of a mantra in late 1998, and was used to
sell the Liberal-National coalition as being closer to the people
than Labor.60 “We put policy out and we defended it and we won
the damned election,”60 Howard declared, and the people’s “be-
loved Labor Party”61 “will have a lot of explaining to do if they
rob Australians of a $650-$700 rebate.”47 (our emphasis)
Supporting frame 4: What’s in it for me?
This final frame focused on the financial benefits of the rebate
for individuals. There were few occurrences – only eight articles
in 131, and The Daily Telegraph led the way with six of the eight
occurrences. After the rebate was passed the Telegraph’s copy was
suddenly peppered with families and their savings, couched in
terms of extra money for Christmas. The rebate was a “rescue
package”, a “pre-Christmas boon”, a “gift for families”, and the
impact was “stunning”, with the industry reporting “floods” and
“blitzes” of calls and “skyrocketing” membership, despite nega-
tive reports elsewhere.3,44,62 Most extraordinary was the headline
‘John’s $12 tonic’ the morning after the vote,52 based on the cal-
culation that the average family would save $12 a week on top
cover.
Discussion
Sydney print media reportage provides little evidence of strate-
gic advocacy against the rebate. None of the frames fit within
Ryan’s ‘mobilising’ schema: framing suggested that the Govern-
ment, rather than the community, had the power to decide, and no
focal point for resistance was apparent. Opposition arguments
came largely from the Senate during debate. Public opposition
was rarely reported, and occasional comments from the Doctor’s
Reform Society were drowned out by the AMA and the private
health industry. Policy-by-cash-incentive was reinforced by the
framing of health financing as an individual responsibility and
the promotion of $12 in consumers’ pockets over societal equity.
The emphasis on political battles and bribes distracted from the
consequences for the health care system and was highly demobi-
lising. This illustrates the undermining of accountability that
occurs when the ability to pass bills becomes the measure of po-
litical performance, and could have been subverted by framing
Harradine as a David fighting the Goliath of the Government’s
unjust policies instead of as an innocent too easily seduced.
In Iyengar’s terms, episodic framing won the day, with the most
Health and Health Care John’s $12 tonic
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dramatic example being the unexplained but frightening threat of
health system collapse. Of the frames represented, only “you get
what you deserve” and “it won’t work and it’s not fair” could be
seen as thematic, constituting 109 out of 259 coded frame occur-
rences. The latter was not enriched by imagery, case studies or
metaphors. Reports using this frame relied on fact-based argu-
ment, and did not highlight societies and individuals who had
suffered under the privatisation of health care. In contrast, “you
get what you deserve” was complex and rhetorical, and was the
most ‘de-mobilising’ frame. It was reinforced by the predicted
collapse of the public health system. It resonated with Australian
traditions of disdain for the excessively wealthy and a fair go for
the underdog, using images more common in Labor campaign-
ing of hard-working battlers desperate for a helping hand to cover
the expense of good quality care. It benefited from case studies
of people disadvantaged by the gap, providing the Coalition with
the opportunity to ‘solve’ a problem through their action on
insurance. It was also sympathetic to Howard’s love of individual
responsibility and decreased Government provision of public serv-
ices. It relied on an insidious subtext, implying that only those
who “take responsibility for their own health” (read: are able to
pay for private insurance) deserve assistance, facilitating victim
blaming and permitting Government to abdicate responsibility.
Something that rarely emerged in the debate was the idea of
universal health care as a basic entitlement in a fair society. Those
with private insurance could have been framed as being cheated
by an inefficient, profit-driven system, particularly by reframing
‘gap’ stories as doctors and insurers cooperatively fleecing the
consumer. Contributions to Medicare could have been framed as
responsible social participation and contributions to private
insurance as building a five-star walled society, starving Medi-
care of funds through exemptions and state-federal cost shifting.
Framing of the public healthcare system generally may need at-
tention: constant doomsday scenarios of a failing public system
may devalue it and make it easier to discard. Overall, this study
suggests a need to identify and promote the achievements of the
public system and to frame healthcare as a fundamental public
expenditure.
There was some evidence in this sample that it is possible for
a particular ideology to dominate in one publication but not in
another, potentially resulting in framing effects that differ between
readerships. In this case the differences were highly ironic given
that the paper that most aggressively promoted the rebate was
most read by the demographic least likely to benefit from it. Seg-
mented approaches by advocates are needed to ensure that the
messages provided to different media meet both the conventions
of that media and the needs of its particular audience.
This study is limited by three major caveats, which also sug-
gest directions for further research. First, if resources had been
infinite, the sample would have included other media products,
such as The Australian Financial Review, whose readership stood
to gain from the rebate, major dailies from other states, and
television and radio. Second, it should be stressed that the best
attempts at advocacy do not necessarily make it to final copy: the
lack of representation of the anti-rebate case does not mean that
advocates were not trying hard enough, it may be the result of
impediments beyond the advocates’ control. Finally, it should be
noted that media advocacy is not everything: direct lobbying of
politicians, for example, can be at least equally influential, and is
not considered here.
Health financing is not much of a story. Chronic, complex and
dry, the issues are hard to pin down to events and individuals. In
this case an event (the Senate vote) made it newsworthy and
became the focus. There were in-depth opinion pieces, both sup-
portive and critical, that framed the issues thematically and en-
couraged a deeper understanding. But the majority of pieces
emphasised the political process rather than its implications. From
our perspective, a profound shift in favour of an unworkable,
profit-driven system was often framed as a political triumph for
responsible Australian families and their quest for self-determi-
nation. Episodic framing defeated political accountability, as
Howard appeared to solve, rather than create, a problem.
Since 1999, the Howard Government has further pursued its
objective of providing “choice through private health insurance”,
supported by a $16 million mass media campaign.4 In March 2001,
the health funds reportedly had an “embarrassment of riches” as
a result of these policies, making a profit in the last financial year
of $344 million, in contrast to the $11 million loss made in 1998.63
Sadly, these changes have been opposed by few in the public do-
main. There is an urgent need in this climate to fight for the fu-
ture of Medicare by providing an alternative view and making it
compelling for both news editors and the public.
References
1. Martin L. Health rebate vote in the balance. Sydney Morning Herald 1998
Dec 10;7.
2. Martin L. Deal secures rebate. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Dec 11;1.
3. Symons E. Health rebate’s a Christmas bonus. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Dec
12;4.
4. Whelan J. Running for cover. Sydney Morning Herald 2000 Nov 11;31.
5. Department of Health and Aged Care. Health and Aged Care: 2000-01 At a
Glance [online]. Canberra: DHAC, May 2000 [cited 12 March 2001]. Avail-
able from internet: URL http://www.health.gov.au/budget2000/glancecov.htm
6. Kerin J. Howard’s big steal. The Australian 1998 Dec 12;27.
7. Martin L. Harradine refuses to say why he backed rebate. Sydney Morning
Herald 1998 Dec 12;7.
8. Friends of Medicare. Fact Sheet Two: Private Health Insurance [online].
Canberra: Public Health Association, Sept 1999 [cited 01 July 2000].
Available from internet URL:http://www.phaa.net.au/friends_of_medicare/
frame_friends_of_medicare.html
9. Iyengar S. Is Anyone Responsible? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
10. Ryan C. Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organising.
Boston: South End Press, 1991.
11. Baum F. The New Public Health: An Australian Perspective. South Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1998.
12. Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive LLC trading as Factiva. Reuters’
Business Briefing. International: Factiva [cited August 1999]. Available for
subscribers from Internet: URL: http://www.factiva.com/
13. Fairfax Publishing. Sydney Morning Herald [CD ROM]. Sydney: Fairfax
Publishing, 1998-99 [released quarterly, cited August 1999].
14. Kingston M. Labor plans to bat for the battlers. Sydney Morning Herald 1998
Aug 14;12.
15. Saunders M, Kerin J. ALP, Democrats to block private health rebate plan. The
Australian 1998 Sept 25;7.
16. Kerin J. $1.2 bn to put floor under funds freefall. The Australian 1998 Aug
15;7.
17. Martin L. Howard defiant over private health rebate proposal. Sydney Morn-
ing Herald 1998 Nov 27;8.
Carter and Chapman Article
2001 VOL. 25 NO. 3 AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 271
18. Dunlevey S. Rebate scheme in bad health. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Dec
1;18.
19. Kerin J. Health rebate to wealthy. The Australian 1998 Aug 20;2.
20. Allard T. ALP aims to recover the heart of health. Sydney Morning Herald
1998 Sept 11;11.
21. Gittins R. Health rebates no cure at all. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Nov
25;19.
22. Martin L. Health rebate talks collapse. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Nov
26;8.
23. Kelly P. Fistful-of-dollars PM pumped up like never before. The Australian
1998 Aug 14;1.
24. Millett M. Family matters. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Aug 14;1.
25. Steketee M. Rebate is means to an end. The Australian 1998 Nov 28;6.
26. Kerin J. Rebate helps ailing health insurance. The Australian 1998 Nov 18;5.
27. Health rebate. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Aug 15;44.
28. Tingle L. Wealthy to benefit as private health funds hook up to a huge drip.
Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Aug 14;3.
29. Downey M. PM faces new health revolt. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Sept
28;1.
30. Labor policy fails holistic health test. The Australian 1998 Sept 11;14.
31. Steketee M. Failing health. The Australian 1998 Aug 29;24.
32. Ragg M. Psst, wanna buy a deal on rebates? The Australian 1998 Dec 16;15.
33. Health rebate closer. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Dec 11;2.
34. Kerin J. Howard’s health emergency. The Australian 1998 Jun 01;9.
35. Kerin, J. More help for health funds. The Australian 1998 May 26;5.
36. Kerin J. Pre-poll bid to resuscitate health funds. The Australian 1998 May
21;2.
37. Kerin J. Campaign highlights health pains. The Australian 1998 Mar 12;5.
38. Dunlevy S. More desert health funds. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Aug 13;2.
39. Dunlevy S. Costly cure for health funds. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Nov 26;2.
40. Dunlevy S. Health care to collapse: Doctors. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Nov
7;7.
41. Brand D. The issues that have not dominated the campaign. The Australian
1998 Oct 3;20.
42. Tingle L and Doherty L. Cash injection ruled out as funds bleed. Sydney
Morning Herald 1998 May 21;4.
43. Myers K. Postscript. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Dec 7;16.
44. Luff D. Now the haggling begins to remove gaps. The Daily Telegraph 1999
Dec 12;4.
45. Downey M. Health at a premium. Sydney Morning Herald 1998 Dec 5;36.
46. Martin L. Democrat bid to split health rebate payout. Sydney Morning Herald
1998 Dec 9;6.
47. Martin L. Democrat wish list may sink rebate. Sydney Morning Herald 1998
Dec 2;7.
48. Fate of health insurance rebate in hands of independents. The Daily Telegraph
1998 Dec 9;9.
49. Martin L. Coalition threatens ‘hardball’ on rebate. Sydney Morning Herald
1998 Dec 5;3.
50. Martin L. Harradine threatens to block health care rebate. Sydney Morning
Herald 1998 Nov 24;4.
51. Dunlevy S. Loyalty bonus for health fund members. The Daily Telegraph
1998 Dec 4;15.
52. Hilferty T. John’s $12 tonic: family savings as new deal passed. The Daily
Telegraph 1998 Dec 11;1.
53. Farr M. $40 tax cut: how the money gets in your pocket. The Daily Telegraph
1998 Aug 14;1.
54. Garcia L. Emergency patients face long wait. Sydney Morning Herald 1998
Dec 5;5.
55. Dunlevy S. Looking healthier: Private insurance rebate of 30 per cent. The
Daily Telegraph 1998 Aug 14;8.
56. Akerman P. Laboring on who delivers. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Nov 26;11.
57. More leave health cover. The Daily Telegraph 1998 Nov 20;4.
58. Allard T. Patients want health insurance incentives. Sydney Morning Herald
1998 Nov 16;2.
59. Kerin J. Colston likely to derail rebate. The Australian 1998 Nov 24;3.
60. Farr M. Coalition tackles the new year with resolution. The Daily Telegraph
1998 Dec 7;11.
61. Farr M, Dunlevy S. PM tackles Carr on health rebate. The Daily Telegraph
1998 Dec 5;2.
62. Luff D. Haggling begins to make pockets healthier. The Daily Telegraph 1998
Dec 12;4.
63. Whelan, J. Health funds too rich to get a top-up, says ratings agency. Sydney
Morning Herald 2001 Mar 29;5.
Health and Health Care John’s $12 tonic
